Manufacturer's carbon abatement strategy and selection of spent power battery collecting mode based on echelon utilization and cap-and-trade policy

Abstract

With the rapid development of the electric vehicle industry, collecting large-scale spent power batteries has become a thorny issue. In this paper, considering the carbon cap-and-trade policy and the echelon utilization of spent power batteries, we investigate four power battery collecting modes, i.e., completed by (1) the retailer (Mode I), (2) the retailer and the echelon utilizer (Mode II), (3) the retailer and the power battery recycler (Mode III), (4) the retailer, the echelon utilizer and the power battery recycler (Mode IV). The equilibrium results are obtained by solving the Stackelberg game models. Results show that: (1) when the competition intensity is below a certain threshold and the collecting price sensitivity is above a certain threshold, the manufacturer's optimal collecting mode is Mode IV, otherwise, the manufacturer's optimal collecting mode is Mode II; (2) the manufacturer's optimal carbon emission reduction level decreases with the increase of initial carbon emissions, decreases with the increase of investment cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction, and increases first and then decreases with the increase of unit carbon transaction price; (3) the engagement of the echelon utilizer in collecting business always has a positive effect on improving the manufacturer's profit.