Manufacturers' brand advertising and how it influences manufacturers' and retailers' margins

Abstract

This article describes the effects of manufacturers' brand advertising on the costs, margins and prices of firms in a real-life, 'dual-stage' world where manufacturers sell to retailers who resell to consumers. Unlike 'single-stage' models, which are frequently used by economists, in which manufacturers appear to sell directly to consumers or to deal with them through an inert distribution system, retailers in a dual-stage world neither buy nor sell as perfect competitors. Although in some industry structures advertising will raise prices to consumers, the welfare effects of advertising are far more benign in a dual-stage world. In intensively advertised categories consumers are more disposed to switch stores within brand than brands within store (just the opposite of relationships in categories where brand franchises are weak) causing there to be an inverse association between margins at the two stages. Thus, while intensive advertising will normally raise factory prices it will drive down retailer margins, often to the point that retail prices are below the levels that would be obtained if the industry were only lightly advertised.