Abstract

This study aims to empirically analyze the factors that influence management in manipulating real activities. The research design is a quantitative method using secondary data. The sample used in this study are 88 companies. Sample selection criteria used are manufacturing companies that have been included in the category of suspect companies during the period 2012-2016. The results of this study indicate that audit quality and managerial ownership have a significant positive effect on real activity manipulation, while the size of the audit committee, the proportion of independent commissioners, and institutional ownership have no influence on real activity manipulation. Limitations in this study is the use of real activity manipulation as the only dependent variable, so that further research can add other theoretical variables that can influence the practice of earnings management through manipulation of real activities, such as voluntary disclosures conducted by companies including CSR. The implication of this study, in running business operations does not focus primarily on current income or the achievement of profit targets to be achieved by manipulating real activities.

Highlights

  • This study aims to empirically analyze the factors that influence management in manipulating real activities

  • The results of this study indicate that audit quality and managerial ownership have a significant positive effect on real activity manipulation, while the size of the audit committee, the proportion of independent commissioners, and institutional ownership have no influence on real activity manipulation

  • Limitations in this study is the use of real activity manipulation as the only dependent variable, so that further research can add other theoretical variables that can influence the practice of earnings management through manipulation of real activities, such as voluntary disclosures conducted by companies including CSR

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Summary

Teori Agensi

Laporan keuangan adalah alat penting yang digunakan oleh perusahaan untuk mengkomunikasikan informasi keuangan kepada investor dan pemangku kepentingan, sambil mengurangi tingkat asimetri informasi yang ada antara pemilik dan manajer (Ball, Tyler, & Wells, 2015). Berdasarkan asumsi sifat dasar manusia dan perkembangan perusahaan yang semakin besar, dapat memunculkan konflik kepentingan antara prinsipal (pemilik perusahaan) dan agen (pengelola perusahaan) karena masing masing dari kedua belah pihak berusaha untuk mencapai serta mempertahankan tingkat kemakmuran. Konflik kepentingan ini merupakan masalah keagenan (agency problem) yang muncul akibat adanya asimetri informasi antara prinsipal dan agen. Pada kenyataannya manajer terkadang tidak mengungkapakan seluruh informasi akuntansi tersebut dengan mencerminkan keadaan yang sebenarnya karena munculnya perbedaan kepentingan antara prinsipal dan agen tersebut (Pratiwi, 2013)

Manipulasi Aktivitas Riil
Kualitas Audit
Komite Audit
Proporsi Dewan Komisaris
Kepemilikan Manajerial
Kepemilikan institusional
Populasi Sampel
Variabel dependen
Variabel independen
Statistik Deskriptif
Cumulative Percent
Standardized Coefficients
Daftar Referensi
Full Text
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