Mandatory Retirement and Justice

Abstract

In a number of countries, mandatory retirement has recently been abolished on the grounds of inconsistency with equal opportunity legislation. It is now seen as a form of unfair discrimination. I will argue that this is a mistake; mandatory retirement is not inherently unjust. This does not mean that it is always a desirable policy: whether it is depends on a variety of circumstances. In conditions of high unemployment, I believe that it makes good sense, pro vided the positions it frees up go to younger people rather than simply disappearing. Both strong and weak defenses can be found in the rather sparse philosophical literature. The strong thesis, defended by Samuel LaSelva,1 holds that mandatory retirement is required by justice. The weak thesis, advanced by Gary Wedeking,2 holds only that it ispermitted by justice, that it is not unjust. I will defend the weak thesis only. LaSelva's case for the strong thesis relies on attributing rights to generations, that is, on the existence of collective rights. I argue that his position puts tenure itself in jeopardy. Wedeking's otherwise convincing defense of the weak thesis relies on the mistaken notion that unrestricted aggregation of benefits and harms over a whole lifetime is the only proper basis for evaluating justice with respect to age. While a time-slice approach to age discrimination that focuses on the impact of particular acts of age discrimination is certainly inadequate, I argue that principles of distribution within lifetimes are also necessary. I suggest that ideas developed in the context of the allocation of health-care resources can provide the necessary supplement. Age discrimination has been understood on the model of discrimination on grounds of race or sex. Norman Daniels3 points to crucial differences where age is concerned that entail that some forms of age discrimination are not unfair, and point the way to a more adequate treatment of mandatory retirement.