Mandatory audit fee disclosure and price competition in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market

Abstract

This study empirically examines whether mandatory audit fee disclosure affects audit pricing and price competition in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market. We expect price competition between auditors to intensify after mandatory public disclosure of audit fees because transparency of audit fee information is likely to increase client bargaining power and/or increase competitive pressure. Using a data set including both pre- and post-disclosure audit fees of private clients, we observe that subsequent to mandatory disclosure of audit fees, clients with positive (negative) abnormal audit fees experience a downward (upward) fee adjustment. Consistent with increased price competition following mandatory audit fee disclosure, clients with negative abnormal audit fees are better able to mitigate the upward fee adjustment if they have higher bargaining power or have an auditor facing stronger competitive pressure. These effects are largest in the initial disclosure year, suggesting anticipatory price adjusting behavior by audit firms.