Mandates or Mandarins? Control and Discretion in the Modern Administrative State

Abstract

The development of the state and the growth of *democracy constitute two of the most distinctive tendencies of modern government. The development of an advanced apparatus carries with it claims to the values of continuity, professionalism, expertise, and effectiveness. The other development, that of democracy, encompasses claims to the values of responsiveness, direction, and revitalization. Notwithstanding the desirability of each set of values, the means for meshing them in an optimal mix are hardly obvious. Even though it is widely accepted in democratic settings that the permanent administration must be accountable to constitutionally elected or delegated overseers, the precise terms of this agreement are much more controversial. Almost certainly, few of us come to see the struggle between control and discretion in entirely neutral terms. Typically, depending on our particular inclination, we tend to adopt perspectives that place more weight either on political or on administrative values, regardless of the importance we attach to the need for an optimal mix. Partisans of leadership (and these almost always include the incumbent set of leaders) are doers, not doubters. They want tools, not obstacles. To the extent that doubt exists about the willingness of career administrators to carry out faithfully the policy directions of the leadership, career administrators are viewed by actors as impediments rather than implements. Partisans of politics, consequently, typically look to enhance procedures for control and supervision of the permanent apparatus and, when deemed necessary, to politicize it. Partisans of the career administration, on the other hand, view it as the ballast that maintains the ship of state in unsteady seas. Its resistor-like qualities to the super-charged enthusiasms of new leaders are seen as a virtue, not a vice-a deterrent, in fact, to longer-run damage inflicted by leaders on themselves as well as on the organizational fabric of government. Partisans of public administration thus decry efforts to reduce the independence of career officialdom or to restrict severely discretion. The leadership view in the modern democratic polity is one that we characterize as the mandate perspective. Underlying it is the logic that the elected authorities have either a right, an obli* Although wide agreement exists that in democratic settings the permanent administration must be accountable to constitutionally elected or delegated overseers, the precise terms of the agreement are controversial. The terms are especially elusive and unclear in the United States because the separation of powers system clouds any straightforward principal-agent relationship between authorities and career officials. Competition between the principals, indeed, makes the apparatus a resource worth competing for in an effort to influence programmatic control over public policy. Some recent literature has emphasized the need for presidents to assert stringent control over the apparatus in order to assure compliance with their goals. Politicization of the federal bureaucracy is justified thereby as being either in the broader public interest or at least in a president's own interest. We argue that neither is likely to be the case, and that such efforts invite retaliation on the part of Congress.