Abstract

Abstract We propose a two-echelon remanufacturing model in the context of two periods in which the factor of patent protection of the original manufacturer is considered. Through the analysis of the Stackelberg game among the supplier, the original manufacturer and the remanufacturer we obtain the equilibrium solutions of the unit patent licensing fee of the original manufacturer, the recycling effort degree of the remanufacturer, the wholesale price of new and remanufactured core components and the retail price of new and remanufactured products in the second period which are all dependent on the retail price of new products in the first period in cases with patent protection and without patent protection. In the numerical study we analyze the impacts of the remanufacturing rate of used products and the retail price of new products in the first period on the equilibrium results of the second period, and make a comparison between the case with patent protection and the case without patent protection.

Highlights

  • With the intensification of market competition and the increasingly prominent issues of the resources and environment, the enterprises and society have been paying more attention to the recycling and remanufacturing of used products

  • We consider a two-echelon remanufacturing model of two periods in which the damaged core components detached from the used products collected by the remanufacturer can be remanufactured by the supplier and be manufactured into new products by the original manufacturer, and the undamaged core components can be directly manufactured into remanufactured products by the remanufacturer

  • After the disassembly and detection, γ(0 < γ < 1) part of used core components disassembled from used products collected by the remanufacturer can be directly used for remanufacturing products, and this part of used core components are manufactured into remanufactured products by the remanufacturer with manufacturing cost C and sells them to the market with retail price P2, where we assume there is no difference in quality and price between new products and remanufactured products in the second period, and all the remanufactured products can be sold out because of the government’s advocacy for recycling and remanufacturing

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Summary

Introduction

With the intensification of market competition and the increasingly prominent issues of the resources and environment, the enterprises and society have been paying more attention to the recycling and remanufacturing of used products. Et al.[6] analyze the remanufacturing and pricing policy in three cases of two cycles, multi periods and infinite planning period under the assumption that there are differences between new and remanufactured products. Et al.[12] established a closed-loop supply chain model in which the original manufacturer licenses the third party to remanufacture through patent protection, and analyze the impact of patent licensing factors on the recycling and remanufacturing of used products. Et al.[14] studied two kinds of S-M closed-loop supply chain in which the supplier participates in recycling and remanufacturing of components or not under the background of strong supplier, and comparatively analyze the pricing decision and revenue in two cases. The above literatures have studied the topics of remanufacturing competition, optimal decision making and interest coordination of the closed loop supply chain from different perspectives.

Model and Assumptions
Equilibrium Analysis with Patent Protection
Equilibrium Analysis Without Patent Protection
Numerical Study
Concluding Remarks
Full Text
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