Abstract
Samuel Huntington once defined ‘the modern problem of civil‐military relations’ as managing the relationship between military experts and civilian ministers. The expert/minister problem arises not simply because senior military officers and defense officials hold a monopoly on technical and operational expertise, but also because they are charged by governments to execute policy, a duty that invites their interpretation of those policies. This paper seeks to examine two critical questions: what kind of continuing relationship between experts and ministers best serves liberal democracies in the long run and what strategies and instruments best allow ministers of defense to control defense policy outcomes and the activities of armed forces.
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