Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961

Abstract

The U.S.-orchestrated overthrow of the democratic government of Guatemala in 1954 has taken its place as a defining moment of America's Cold War crusade. Many scholars have described the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) campaign of propaganda and subversion, which culminated in the June 1954 removal of Guatemalan president Jacobo Ar-benz Guzmán. Less is known about the U.S.Guatemalan relationship in the succeeding years. Stephen M. Streeter addresses this gap in the literature with his well-written and interesting account of the Eisenhower administration's goals and policies for Guatemala after 1954, in which he denounces the American actions that “bequeathed to Guatemala human tragedy, economic dependence, and political disorder.” Streeter is interested in the “goals, instruments, and consequences” of the Eisenhower administration's policies toward Guatemala during the years 1954–1961. He uses the concept of “hegemony” as his theoretical framework and declares that fears of Communist activity in Guatemala were of less importance to U.S. policy makers than was the fact that Guatemala's democratic and reformist government “empowered Guatemalan peasants and workers to challenge class oppression and U.S. economic imperialism.” Anticommunism was a mere pretext for U.S. actions.