Abstract

World Bank evaluations show that recipient performance varies substantially between different projects. Extant research has focused on country-level variables when explaining these variations. This article goes beyond country-level explanations and highlights the role of World Bank staff. We extend established arguments in the literature on compliance with the demands of International Organizations (IOs) and hypothesize that IO staff can shape recipient performance in three ways. First, recipient performance may be influenced by the quality of IO staff monitoring and supervision. Second, the leniency and stringency with which IO staff apply the aid agreement could improve recipient performance. Third, recipient performance may depend on whether IO staff can identify and mobilize supportive interlocutors through their networks in the recipient country. We test these arguments by linking a novel database on the tenure of World Bank task team leaders to projects evaluated between 1986 and 2020. The findings are consistent with the expectation that World Bank staff play an important role, but only in investment projects. There is substantial evidence that World Bank staff supervisory ability and country experience are linked to recipient performance in those projects. Less consistent evidence indicates that leniency could matter. These findings imply that World Bank staff play an important role in facilitating implementation of investment projects.

Highlights

  • Development finance agreements between the World Bank and recipient governments mandate a range of behaviors in implementation, including, for instance, commitment to the project, conducting stakeholder consultations, resolution of implementation issues, adequate financial management and adequate procurement

  • This research on compliance focuses almost entirely on country-level variations (Börzel et al 2010; Koliev et al 2020; Simmons 2009; Vreeland 2006). We add to this compliance debate in two important ways: first, we extend its arguments with insights on the characteristics of international bureaucrats from the respective literature in international administration

  • We argue that individual differences between staff members explain why the World Bank will vary in its quality of supervision

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Summary

Introduction

Development finance agreements between the World Bank and recipient governments mandate a range of behaviors in implementation, including, for instance, commitment to the project, conducting stakeholder consultations, resolution of implementation issues, adequate financial management and adequate procurement. We contribute to the literature on compliance in International Relations In their seminal study, Girod and Tobin (2016) contrast a strategic importance hypothesis with an alternative income hypothesis to convincingly demonstrate that countries with lower income dependence on World Bank projects are less likely to fulfil the expectations of the World Bank in the project. Such differences between countries can still not account for a substantial degree of the variation we observe in recipient performance.

Recipient performance and the role of task team leaders
Three explanations for the influence of staff
Supervisory ability and recipient performance
Leniency and recipient performance
Research design
Dependent variable
Staff-level variables
Control variables
Analysis
Assessing the three explanations for staff influence
Biased ratings
Selection into projects
Omitted variables and alternative measurements
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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