Abstract
Much of the literature relating to managing marketing relationships focuses on limiting opportunistic activities by one or both partners in a relationship. Opportunistic behavior occurs when one partner seeks a short-term gain in a way that may damage the other partner or the relationship. In the case of a hotel belonging to a network or chain, such actions might include falsifying or suppressing monthly sales data. A study of over 400 individual hotels belonging to two hotel chains investigated the extent to which opportunism of individual hotels is limited by three governance mechanisms. Those mechanisms are (1) ownership by chain headquarters, (2) a hotel's investment in transaction-specific assets (e.g., reservation-system software), and (3) shared norms of relational exchange. Of the three, taken either singly or together, only the shared norms of relational exchange were at all effective in managing hotel opportunism. Hotel opportunism declined with higher degrees of relational exchange. Hotel opportunism was exacerbated, however, when ownership or investments in transaction-specific assets were emphasized as governance mechanisms.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: The Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
