Abstract

This paper starts from the perspective that resource management approaches are based upon a body of environmental knowledge. By analysing fisheries management in Mweru-Luapula, Zambia, I argue that this body of environmental knowledge has 1) remained largely unchanged throughout the recent shift to co-management and 2) is to a great extent based upon general paradigmatic conventions with regard to common property regimes. The article outlines the historical trajectories of both resource management and the political ecology of Mweru-Luapula's fishing economy. Using a relational perspective – by looking at interaction of the local fishing economy with external developments, but also by examining socioeconomic relations between individual actors – this article exposes constraints and incentives within the local fishing economy that are not absorbed in the current co-management regime. These findings challenge both policy goals and community-based resource management itself. I argue that governance of small-scale fisheries – in order to close the gap between locally based understandings, policy and legislation – should always be built upon all dimensions (social, economic, ecological, and political) that define a fisheries system.Keywords: co-management, common-property resource management, political ecology, Mweru-Luapula fishery, Zambia.

Highlights

  • Many scholars assume that most small-scale inland fishery communities represent the poorest sections of rural societies (Béné 2003)

  • This claim is often argued through what Béné calls the "old paradigm" on poverty in inland fisheries: poverty is associated with natural factors including the ecological effects of high catch rates and exploitation levels

  • The view of inland fishing communities as the "poorest of the poorest" does not imply directly that fishing automatically lead to poverty, but it is linked to the nature of many inland fishing areas as a common-pool resources (CPRs) (Gordon 2005)

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Summary

Introduction

Many scholars assume that most small-scale inland fishery communities represent the poorest sections of rural societies (Béné 2003). As Haller (2007:1) explained, the model of the tragedy of the commons "seems to have encouraged many governments in the South to take rights and responsibilities related to resources out of the hands of local groups and to legitimize this by claiming that the overuse of CPRs such as forests, wildlife, fisheries and pastures was the result of this tragedy." It is widely acknowledged, that conventional centralized management of natural resources has failed to improve resource development, due to a lack of enforcement capacity and insufficient legitimacy at the local level to ensure compliance with regulation measures (Andrew and Evans 2011; Jul-Larsen and Van Zwieten 2002). The historical trajectories of both the governance and the socioeconomic structures of Mweru's fisheries will be investigated simultaneously

Theoretical elaboration: the arguments
This research
Parallel transformations: institutional and socioeconomic change
Social change: the political ecology of inequality
Full Text
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