Managing False Data Injection Attacks During Contingency of Secured Meters

Abstract

One major cyber-threat to energy management system is false data injection attack, where an attacker corrupts a set of meters maliciously in such a way that the conventional methods cannot detect it. For an $n$ bus power system, a method to prevent such threats is by securing a set of $(n-1)$ meters, called a basic measurement set (BMS). We prove, in this paper, that the failure in the protection system of a single meter in a BMS is sufficient to create the most vulnerable form of attacks, if the BMS is not chosen appropriately. Selecting the appropriate BMS (called optimal BMS) is formulated as a multi-objective combinatorial optimization problem. First, a greedy algorithm is developed to find the optimal BMS. Second, if all the necessary meters cannot be secured, a greedy algorithm is developed for securing less than $(n-1)$ meters in an optimal BMS, in such a way that the vulnerability of attack is minimum. Our simulation results confirm that there is a significant improvement in security when the optimal BMS is chosen.