Managing Defeat

Abstract

This chapter examines patterns in Roman defeats, triumphs, and senatorial decision making in the approximately thirty years following Rome’s victory in the Second Punic War. It argues that the Roman Senate controlled the reception of magistrates’ military activities abroad in several ways: among these, it managed the receipt of information at Rome, it prorogued defeated commanders in order to permit the chance of re-engagement, it reined in aggressive conduct abroad, and, especially, it defended triumphal awards as markers of definitive success. This chapter concentrates upon Rome’s wars in Spain (in particular with a case study of events of 195–193, beginning with the campaigns of Cato), Gaul, and Liguria and also discusses the concept of ignominia and the importance of re-engagement in “plotting” defeats as setbacks rather than failures. Ultimately, it argues that conscious narrative patterning underlay determinations about Rome’s wars, both in the Senate and in the field.