Managing dangerous technology

Abstract

Nuclear powered energy is the most significant technological engine of the modern economy. But in the United States we have virtually stalled this engine by inadequate management of the danger posed by nuclear facilities. A circular process of misinformation and misunderstood fact feeds inaction. In part this is the result of the inability of scientists to agree on the potential dangers from radiation owing to meltdown of nuclear fuel in the reactor core. In part it stems from unwillingness to spend the funds necessary to determine, once and for all, what the actual physical results of a major accident would be. In part it stems from the multitude of overlapping agencies in the executive, legislative and regulatory arenas at the federal and state level. Recently, state regulatory commissions, especially the New York Public Service Commission, have begun to realize that their responsibility to approve expenditures of investor-owned utilities gives them significant powers over nuclear plants. This power of the purse must be managed carefully, because it is being exercised in an environment quite different from that in which most nuclear plants were begun. But it is an important aspect of the multifaceted control system we have in the United States; a system which by and large suits the vastness of the country, the many geological differences among nuclear plant sites, and the American concept of representative democracy. Although some long for more centralized control, our decentralized system, with some adjustments such as a permanent scientific advisory board, is most likely to increase our social-political ability to manage dangerous technologies.