Abstract
This review examines the incentives of managers to use investment choices as a tool for building their personal reputations or the reputation of their firms. These incentives come in three main forms: visibility bias, which encourages a manager to try to make short-term indicators of success look better; resolution reference which encourages a manager to try to advance the arrival of good news and delay bad news; and mimicry and avoidence, which encourages a manager to take the actions that the best managers are seen to do, and to avoid the actions the worst managers are seen to do.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
