Abstract
We examine Chinese closed-end funds (CEFs) to determine if poorly performing (outperforming) managers experience a reduction (increase) in assets under management. In other words, we test if there is market-imposed discipline or if managers are able to extract rents from investors by their being a disconnect between performance and assets under management. Our paper is a replication of Wu et al. (2016) who examine the phenomenon in the US market. We find little evidence of market discipline in the Chinese CEF market.
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