Abstract
This research examines the relationship between managerial ownership and opportunistic managerial behavior relating to earnings management. Two apparently conflicting effects of managerial ownership on managers' incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment effect. While abnormal accruals are used as a proxy for earnings management, a new proxy for managerial ownership is developed in this research to capture the institutional setting of listed firms in Jordan. Using a sample of manufacturing firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange between 2017 and 2021, the results suggest that managerial ownership improve the quality of annual earnings by reducing the levels of earnings management. This finding substantiates the incentive alignment effect in Jordan.
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