Abstract
ABSTRACT We examine whether the combination of agency costs of debt and managerial optimism in high-tech IPOs creates inefficient R&D investment, thus undermining corporate value. We find that high-tech IPO firms with a high debt ratio exhibit a positive relationship between discretionary and future R&D expenses at the IPO point. We also find a negative relationship between discretionary R&D expenses and the long-term cumulative abnormal return. Furthermore, managerial optimism and agency costs of debt can increase during an IPO, reducing future value. Thus, a stock return decrease after an IPO may be influenced by management’s psychological errors and shareholders’ preferences for risky investments.
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