Managerial Friction and Land‐Use Policy Punctuations in the Fragmented Metropolis

Abstract

Despite the portrayal of bureaucratic organizations as resistant to change, public managers have some ability to strategically move land‐use processes out of incrementalism, even when bureaucratic lethargy acts as a drag. This article examines managerial influence in land‐use policy by synthesizing theories of political markets and punctuated equilibrium. An information‐processing logic is developed to explain why local government managers shift from “inward” to “outward” land‐use management strategies in periods of environmental change. "Managerial friction” is defined as a strategic managerial adjustment producing punctuated land‐use policy change in the face of environmental changing conditions. Hypotheses are tested using data on Florida local government comprehensive plan amendments and a Bayesian methodological approach. The evidence suggests managerial friction can be distinguished from the effects of environmental and political complexity as well as other forms of institutional friction, including management turnover, legislative institutions, and bureaucratic structure.