Managerial Compensation, Investment and Financial Leverage: An Empirical Analysis of UK Firms.

Abstract

This thesis examines the causal effects of the different components of managerial compensation on the value-critical risk-taking activities, particularly those linked to investment, and financial leverage. Employing a three-stage least squares (3SLS) technique in a system of equations, the study makes interesting contributions to the growing strand of literature using datasets from the UK (FTSE 350) companies for the period 2006 – 2015. Specifically, this scholarly study contributes to the extant literature in three ways. First, the study finds that higher long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and stock options incentive cause more investment in capital expenditure and fixed intangible but less in research and development activity, whilst greater cash bonus induces more intangibles (research and development and fixed intangible) investment but less capital expenditure activity. Largely, the presented evidence is contrary to the view that the risk-motivated incentives (stock options and LTIPs) encourage more riskier activity like RD however, the stock options incentive discourages more borrowing in such governing state. This tends to support the view that the firm’s remuneration committee applies LTIPs in lieu of stock options to minimise managerial excessive risk-taking.