Managerial capture of sustainability assurance. Empirical evidence and capital market reactions

Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the potential influence of managers on sustainability assurance. When the quality of sustainability reporting is questionable because of subsequent restatements, the authors explore whether assurance is used to enhance its credibility as a legitimization tool or as an impression management strategy. Additionally, the authors analyze how capital markets react to this potential managerial capture and, particularly, whether investors penalize this practice through the cost of capital.Design/methodology/approachUsing an international sample from 2012 to 2016 and panel data regressions, this study relies on DICTION’s master variables of optimism and certainty to examine the impact of managers on assurance and the market’s reaction to these practices.FindingsThe study shows that some managers might use assurance as a legitimization tool rather than as a means of reinforcing the credibility of sustainability reporting. In such cases, the results reveal that investors penalize (reward) managerial influence (no influence) on assurance.Practical implicationsThe new findings help companies understand that they will not improve their financing terms if investors perceive that managers have influenced assurance. Moreover, these findings emphasize the need for standardization to clarify assurance criteria and prevent managerial influence.Social implicationsManagerial influence on assurance raises doubts about its value in terms of reducing information asymmetry and especially improving investors’ decision-making.Originality/valueThe present study represents the first evidence of the potential use of assurance for non-informative purposes. The authors provide clear evidence of how investors penalize managerial influence on assurance, in contrast to the mainstream literature, which shows that this practice always improves investors’ decision-making and is rewarded.