Abstract
This paper discusses the relationship between managerial ability]and inefficient investment, as well as the impacts of internal control on them by using information asymmetry and agency theory based on data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies over 2012–2016. (i) Managerial ability alleviates the under-investment caused by information asymmetry but aggravates the over-investment caused by agency problem; (ii) Internal control restrains the relationship between managerial ability and over-investment but promotes the relationship between managerial ability and under-investment. (iii) There is a significant positive correlation between managerial ability and over-investment and internal control has a significant suppressed effect for state-owned firms. (iv) There is a significant negative correlation between managerial ability and under-investment and internal control has a significant promote effect for private-owned firms. (v) Where the firm’s chairman and the general manager are the same person, internal control has little effect on the relationship of managerial ability and over-investment. This study contributes to establish comprehensive analysis framework of inefficient investment and has some implications for corporate investment decision-making behavior.
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