Abstract
We investigate chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) changes in firms that experience an auditor resignation. We argue that boards of directors have incentives to replace these managers following an auditor resignation both to improve financial reporting performance and to restore reporting credibility. We use two control samples, one matched on industry and size and the other comprising firms that experienced client-initiated auditor changes. We observe higher turnover in both CEO and CFO positions following auditor resignations than in either of the two control samples. The incidence in CEO and CFO turnover increases for firms filing auditor resignation-related reportable events.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
