Abstract
This paper adopts the sample of heavily polluting industry listed companies’ data from 2013 to 2018, takes the amount of investment related to environmental protection in “projects under construction” divided by the capital stock as the proxy variable of environmental investment, takes the shareholding ratio of management as the proxy variable of shareholding incentive, empirically tests the relationship between the environmental investment and the incentive of stock ownership, and finds that the incentive of stock ownership significantly promotes the level of environmental investment. In addition, the incentive effect of stock ownership on the level of environmental investment only exists in the sample’s fierce industry competition.
Highlights
The reform and opening up has brought about China’s rapid economic growth, but at the same time it has paid a heavy price of environment and resources
As can be seen from the property right nature (SOE) indicator, among the enterprises investing in environmental protection, state-owned enterprises account for 51.9%, and there is no significant difference in the number of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises
This paper attempts to explore whether the internal governance mechanism of management shareholding incentive can promote enterprises to make environmental investment from the perspective of the management, from the empirical level
Summary
The reform and opening up has brought about China’s rapid economic growth, but at the same time it has paid a heavy price of environment and resources. From the perspective of the investment in environmental pollution control in China, the government is still the main body of environmental pollu-
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