Managed Proliferation in South Asia

Abstract

Last year's nuclear testing by India and Pakistan has focused international attention on ways to prevent future weaponization(f.1) and the deployment of indigenous nuclear weapon capabilities. Calls for both parties to 'roll back' or at least to contain their ongoing nuclear programmes and subscribe fully to existing non-proliferation instruments have been frequent. And the imposition of economic sanctions by members of the international community has been heavily driven by the desire to compel both New Delhi and Islamabad to adopt a non-proliferation course.Unfortunately, such efforts may prove unsuccessful. International sanctions are notoriously inconsistent in their effectiveness. In this instance, they have so far been applied haphazardly and, at best, with modest effect - especially upon India. Sanctions may even exacerbate problems by creating resentment in both India and Pakistan. Recent statements and actions by both India and Pakistan, meanwhile, indicate that, while each appears willing to entertain some limitations on their nuclear capabilities, commitment to fully assembled arsenals remains high.(f.2)Already, some analysts are suggesting that the international community must shift its focus away from policies aimed at restoring the situation before the tests and preventing further weaponization/proliferation on the subcontinent to a more realistic goal of managing it.(f.3) Indeed, while certainly less desirable than non-proliferation, 'managed proliferation' would help ensure that emerging nuclear arsenals are as stable and secure as is humanly and technically possible - reducing thereby many of the dangers which can accompany their development.At present, a preoccupation with preventing the emergence of Indo-Pakistan nuclear arsenals has ensured that such an approach has remained in the background. Nevertheless, should developments on the subcontinent continue to move toward weaponization and deployment, pressure for and attention to a 'managed approach' to proliferation is likely to increase. And recognition of its potential impacts may prove crucial to the formulation of future regional security and non-proliferation policy.Analysis of the nature and consequences of a managed approach yields a mixed assessment - both for security on the subcontinent and for non-proliferation norms generally. Yet current trends suggest that available alternatives may prove even less feasible and desirable. In fact, while managed proliferation is hardly the ideal approach to the south Asian nuclear dilemma, it may nevertheless offer the most realistic response to a difficult situation. Accordingly, greater thought should be devoted to its logic and requirements. Indeed, while ongoing non-proliferation efforts may ultimately prevail, policy-makers must consider the development of realistic alternatives in the event that they do not.DESCRIPTION AND RATIONALEManaged proliferation derives from a conviction that, in the face of a demonstrated nuclear capability and efforts to develop and deploy nuclear weapons, international policy should focus less on eliminating nuclear arsenals and more on the problem of preventing their use. In fact, if the focus on the former is too stringent, nuclear dangers may well increase as the pursuit of abolition eclipses the development of much needed measures for the emergence of stable, safe nuclear arsenals.For new proliferants, achieving nuclear safety and stability can be a particularly daunting task. They may lack the economic base as well as the technological and scientific expertise essential to ensure nuclear safety and security. Traditions of civilian control over the military may be weak. And chronic political instabilities may impede the development and functioning of institutions and processes necessary for effective oversight of nuclear capabilities.Rudimentary arsenals may thus suffer from a range of vulnerabilities, including a lack of secure basing, of robust command and control procedures and practices, and of many of the safety features needed to ensure that nuclear weapons, components, and materials are reliable, safe, and secure. …