Abstract
Arce (2018) presents a game-theoretic model in which users select and hackers target one of two IT platforms based upon the platforms’ network benefits and security levels. Unfortunately, in modelling the network benefits Arce misinterprets Metcalfe’s law. In particular, he assumes that the utility that a user obtains from a platform increases quadratically with the number of users, whereas Metcalfe’s law holds that utility increases linearly with network size. This note shows that with a linear utility function the distribution of hackers across the two platforms is less skewed. In addition, we extend upon Arce’s work by demonstrating that weaker network externalities reduce the set of conditions under which the market can be monopolised.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
