Malicious data injection attacks risk mitigation strategy of cyber–physical power system based on hybrid measurements attack detection and risk propagation

Abstract

Malicious data injection attacks (MDIAs) can tamper with the measurements of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and wide area measurement system (WAMS), which seriously affect the state estimation of cyber–physical power system (CPPS). The existing researches mostly focus on SCADA system, ignoring the vulnerability of phasor measurement unit (PMU) in WAMS, and not considering that MDIA can propagate through the communication network of CPPS as a kind of network attack, which seriously affects the safe operation of CPPS. Aiming at these problem, a risk mitigation strategy based on SCADA/WAMS hybrid measurement networks is proposed. Firstly, a malicious data detection mechanism based on dynamic time warping (DTW) distance is proposed, which includes two parts: state predictor and malicious data identifier. Then, based on the attack detection results, a risk mitigation model is proposed which minimizes the risk level of the system by disabling the damaged meters caused by the propagation of malicious data, while maintaining the observability of CPPS. Finally, the cooperation mechanism of MDIA detection and multi-scenario risk mitigation strategy for hybrid measurement networks is proposed. Case study based on IEEE 14-bus system and IEEE 57-bus system verifies the effectiveness of the risk mitigation strategy proposed in this article.