Abstract
To mitigate the risks and maximise the opportunities arising from China’s great power behaviour, Malaysia employed a hedging strategy during Mahathir Mohamad’s second term as prime minister. From 2018 until 2020, the middle power Malaysia applied direct engagement and elements of limited balancing and limited bandwagoning in a flexible yet consistent manner. Neither China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) nor its actions in the South China Sea caused a sea change in Malaysia’s hedging strategy. Crucially, the policies towards China were embedded in omnidirectional, friendly, and well-balanced relations with the United States, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Theoretically, this contribution applies an updated concept of hedging, initially introduced by Cheng-Chwee Kuik. As an important innovation, it adds a specific component to assess the perceptions of the political leader(s) of risks and opportunities related to the hedging target as well as the strategic value of potential balancing partners.
Highlights
Malaysia and China share “a cautiously friendly relationship” (Kwek and Hoo, 2020)
After his surprising return to power in May 2018, Mahathir, stopped certain key projects that Malaysia and China had signed under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
In applying an updated hedging framework, based on Kuik (2008, 2016a, 2016b) and with interesting amendments made by Hiep (2013), this article aims at making a humble contribution to the theoretical discussion and empirical analysis of hedging in Southeast Asia
Summary
Malaysia and China share “a cautiously friendly relationship” (Kwek and Hoo, 2020). Despite the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea, bilateral – and in particular economic – relations improved under Prime Minister Najib Razak (2009–2018) All in all, he continued the use of a hedging strategy towards China, already employed by Mahathir Mohamad during his first term in office (1981–2003; Goh, 2016; Kuik, 2016a: 156; Wey, 2017: 397). He continued the use of a hedging strategy towards China, already employed by Mahathir Mohamad during his first term in office (1981–2003; Goh, 2016; Kuik, 2016a: 156; Wey, 2017: 397) After his surprising return to power in May 2018, Mahathir, stopped certain key projects that Malaysia and China had signed under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI and the South China Sea dispute will be used as the two key variables for assessing Putrajaya’s strategy towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during Prime Minister Mahathir’s second term from May 2018 until February 2020
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