Abstract
In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the East Asian financial crisis in July 1997, the first generation of currency crisis theories — which had focused on public sector debt related tofiscal deficits — were very soon seen as irrelevant to South-east Asia, since most of the affected governments had consistently maintained budgetary surpluses in recent years. Many observers immediately assumed that the crises were due to poor macroeconomic management, as suggested by the second generation of theories seeking to explain currency crises.
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