Abstract
Episodic memory often is conceptualized as a uniquely human system of long-term memory that makes available knowledge accompanied by the temporal and spatial context in which that knowledge was acquired. Retrieval from episodic memory entails a form of first–person subjectivity called autonoetic consciousness that provides a sense that a recollection was something that took place in the experiencer's personal past. In this paper I expand on this definition of episodic memory. Specifically, I suggest that (1) the core features assumed unique to episodic memory are shared by semantic memory, (2) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet interacting, “enabling” systems. Although these systems—ownership, self, subjective temporality, and agency—are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (3) the type of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection (autonoetic) is relational rather than intrinsic—i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, thus rendering episodic memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory.
Highlights
I suggest that (1) the core features assumed unique to episodic memory are shared by semantic memory, (2) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet interacting, “enabling” systems
These systems—ownership, self, subjective temporality, and agency—are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (3) the type of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection is relational rather than intrinsic—i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, rendering episodic memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory
In what sense does the relative stability confer a temporal status on a specific content? That is, what determines if the content, as experienced, is classified as episodic or as semantic? Dalla Barba (2002) suggests that the stability of a representation is correlated with what we typically describe as episodic memory by virtue of the fact that temporal consciousness (TC) takes such content as its intentional object
Summary
The memory content psychologists classify as semantic often, though not invariably, tends to be represented as stable, summaries of (often repeated) experiences that share features in common While such content is acted on by KC rather than by TC (i.e., autonoetic awareness), there is nothing in Dalla Barba’s model that precludes KC (i.e., noetic awareness) from recruiting an individual’s logical abilities to inferentially place “stable” content in a temporal context, provided the representation being addressed contains temporallyrelevant constituents. Why his mental machinery was able to conjoin autonoetic awareness with content as memories were being built, but not when recollecting memories of pre-injury events, remains unclear
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