Making Sense of Neonatal Imitation

Abstract

This essay applies philosophical principles and method to compare `imitation' as it is used in everyday contexts with its use in laboratory research and theorizing on human neonates. Its primary goal is to demonstrate the practicability and effectiveness of a philosophical method of conceptual analysis and to suggest benefits of the method's use in contexts of empirical research and theorizing in psychology. A selective summary of research and theorizing including and subsequent to Meltzoff and Moore's experiments on neonatal imitation is followed by a discussion of general principles of conceptual analysis in the analytical tradition, including the distinction between `sense' and `nonsense'. The concept of imitation is analyzed toward producing a `conceptual snapshot' for direct comparison between its possibilities of use and meaning outside and in the laboratory. Analysis shows that the concept is virtually devoid of sense in latter contexts. Results of analysis are defended against possible objections and applied to some relevant theorizing.