Making Morality Work

Abstract

Moral theories can play both a theoretical and a practical role. As theories, they provide accounts of which features make actions right or wrong. In practice, they provide standards by which we guide our choices. Regrettably, limits on human knowledge often prevent people from using traditional moral theories to make decisions. Decision makers labor under false beliefs, or they are ignorant or uncertain about the circumstances and consequences of their possible actions. An agent so hampered cannot successfully use her chosen moral theory as a decision-guide. This book examines three major strategies for addressing this “epistemic problem” in morality. One strategy argues that the epistemic limitations of agents are defects in them but not in the moral theories, which are only required to play the theoretical role. A second strategy holds that the main or sole point of morality is to play the practical role, so that any theory incapable of guiding decisions must be rejected in favor of a more usable theory. The third strategy claims the correct theory can play both the theoretical and practical role through a two-tier structure. The top tier plays the theoretical role, while the lower tier provides a coordinated set of user-friendly decision-guides to provide practical guidance. Agents use the theoretical account indirectly to guide their choices by directly utilizing the supplementary decision-guides.Making Morality Work argues that the first two strategies should be rejected, and develops an innovative version of the third strategy.