Abstract

This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby complementing Amy Kind's argument for the epistemic relevance of imagination "under constraints" and Magdalena Balcerak Jackson's argument for justification by imagination.

Highlights

  • Imagination is said to be mostly voluntary and under our control

  • In recent publications, Amy Kind (2018) and Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (2018) contest these positions in separate ways. They argue that imagination can teach us something new, and can justify our choices, when imagination is constrained by beliefs and wishes (Kind), or due to its recreative nature (Balcerak Jackson)

  • We’ll argue that it’s beliefs about bodies, or perceptual simulations, that can play a role in constraining imagination—a view consistent with weak embodied cognition (EC)—and that embodiment understood in a stronger sense as including processes related to embodied motoric processes, as well as more explicit processes that involve movement and body-environment coupling, can constrain imagination

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Imagination is said to be mostly voluntary and under our control. Aside from logical impossibilities and morally deviant worlds (Gendler, 2000, 2010), we seem able to imagine anything we want. We’ll argue that it’s beliefs about bodies, or perceptual simulations, that can play a role in constraining imagination—a view consistent with weak EC—and that embodiment understood in a stronger sense as including processes related to embodied motoric processes, as well as more explicit processes that involve movement and body-environment coupling, can constrain imagination. It considers the worry expressed by ClavelVázquez and Clavel Vázquez that while body schemas can constrain imagination, the role of these constraints is limiting: one cannot get away from one’s own perspective.

The ’Up‐To‐Us Challenge’ and imagining under constraints
Imaginings constrained by beliefs
Imaginings constrained by perceptions
Different views of embodied cognition and imagination
Rooted bodily processes and their role in imagination
The ’body as content’ view
The epistemic relevance of rooted bodily processes
The challenge of perspective‐taking
The added value of explicit embodiment to epistemic relevance of imagination
The value of movement for imagining and pretend play
The epistemic value of explicitly embodied imagination
Conclusion
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call