Abstract
This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby complementing Amy Kind's argument for the epistemic relevance of imagination "under constraints" and Magdalena Balcerak Jackson's argument for justification by imagination.
Highlights
Imagination is said to be mostly voluntary and under our control
In recent publications, Amy Kind (2018) and Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (2018) contest these positions in separate ways. They argue that imagination can teach us something new, and can justify our choices, when imagination is constrained by beliefs and wishes (Kind), or due to its recreative nature (Balcerak Jackson)
We’ll argue that it’s beliefs about bodies, or perceptual simulations, that can play a role in constraining imagination—a view consistent with weak embodied cognition (EC)—and that embodiment understood in a stronger sense as including processes related to embodied motoric processes, as well as more explicit processes that involve movement and body-environment coupling, can constrain imagination
Summary
Imagination is said to be mostly voluntary and under our control. Aside from logical impossibilities and morally deviant worlds (Gendler, 2000, 2010), we seem able to imagine anything we want. We’ll argue that it’s beliefs about bodies, or perceptual simulations, that can play a role in constraining imagination—a view consistent with weak EC—and that embodiment understood in a stronger sense as including processes related to embodied motoric processes, as well as more explicit processes that involve movement and body-environment coupling, can constrain imagination. It considers the worry expressed by ClavelVázquez and Clavel Vázquez that while body schemas can constrain imagination, the role of these constraints is limiting: one cannot get away from one’s own perspective.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have