Abstract

Because corruption must be hidden from the public, transaction costs arising are of a different type than those of legal exchange. Moreover, because of the ever-present threat of mutual denunciation partners of a corrupt agreement are “locked-in” to each other even after an exchange has been finalized. This results in corrupt agreements being primarily arranged by middlemen or emerging as a by-product of legal exchange. It is concluded that corruption has little do with free competition. Fighting corruption should focus less on individual moral attitudes or penalties and more on methods to destabilize corrupt relationships.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.