Making bird numbers count: Would Dutch farmers accept a result-based meadow bird conservation scheme?

Abstract

Current management contracts under agri-environmental schemes (AES) are often action-based. This means that farmers are reimbursed for the costs incurred when implementing conservation measures but are not paid based on actual improvements in environmental outcomes. In theory, result-based schemes with payments for outcomes can improve the cost and ecological effectiveness of AES. This article analyses farmers' acceptance of a hypothetical meadow bird management scheme that includes payments for results. The tested scheme was developed together with a Dutch farmer collective and resulted in a hybrid scheme including both result-based and action-based elements. In a discrete choice experiment, farmers were offered (1) a bonus payment that depended on the collective's nature conservation success, and (2) an individual bonus payment that rewarded farmers implementing measures that are expected to contribute more to the success of conservation. Results show that the acceptance of the hypothetical hybrid scheme is high (75%). The collective bonus was evaluated positively when the collective bonus on offer was high (€ 1000/farmer), but a latent class analysis indicates that this does not apply uniformly to all farmers.