Majority rule versus democracy in deeply divided societies

Abstract

Abstract Consociational theory challenges the two paradigmatic notions that democracy should be equated with majority rule and that democracy is not a viable form of government in deeply divided societies. The alternative to majoritarian democracy is consociational democracy. Its four principal characteristics stand in sharp contrast with majoritarian principles: (1) the grand coalition principle means joint consensual rule; (2) the mutual veto may also be termed negative minority rule; (3) proportionality entails fair and equal treatment instead of the disproportionality in favor of majorities that majority rule usually entails; and (4) segmental autonomy may be characterized as minority rule over the minority itself in the area of the minority's exclusive concern. Consociationalism is both more democratic and more practical than majority rule in culturally and ethnically divided societies. Moreover, in plural societies with extremely deep cleavages, majority rule and democracy are incompatible, and consociationalism offers the only realistic possibility to attain a viable democratic system.