Majority Rule: The Right May Be Wrong

Abstract

Majority rule is based on decisions taken by a (simple or weighted) majority vote. Binary voting, however, is inaccurate. Other more reliable decision-making voting methodologies exist. Indeed, just as there are numerous voting procedures which can be used in elections, so too there are (rather fewer but) several voting procedures which can be used in decision-making. Some of the latter are non-majoritarian. If, then, it were possible to identify the collective will of the elected chamber by a procedure which was non-majoritarian, the logic on which the principle of majority rule is based would become obsolescent. In which case, governance could be based on an all-party coalition. Accordingly, this chapter examines majoritarian decision-making and electoral systems. It questions the democratic legitimacy of forming a majoritarian government, be it a single-party administration or a multi-party coalition. It looks at two other democratic structures, the first consociational and the second consensual, and it analyses other decision-making methodologies. Finally, it outlines a taxonomy of decision-making.