Majority Rule in Consensual Democracies: Explaining Political Influence in Norwegian Local Councils

Abstract

Norwegian local government has traditionally been strongly rooted in the consensus ideal. When the new Local Government Act of 1992 allowed the municipalities to introduce parliamentary models and abolished the statutory requirement of qualified majority decisions in the councils, this therefore implied a significant change in the local government ideal. Even though the municipalities have been reluctant to formally adopt a parliamentary model, this paper argues that in practice a majority system is replacing the traditional consensual model, with functional roles for a governing majority and an opposition. The empirical analysis employs data on local politicians from 1994 and 1998 to test the proposition that representatives of the governing parties exert more influence on local policies than members of the opposition. Two different indicators of political influence are used: (1) the councillors' budgetary influence measured as the distance between the councillors' ideal point and the actual decision outcome, and (2) the councillors' ability to have initiatives accepted in the various local political bodies. In addition to the variable representing membership of the governing majority or the opposition, the model also controls for factors such as the representatives' formal institutional affiliation, individual characteristics and community context. Even when controlling for these determinants, the empirical results strongly support the hypothesis.