Majority Rule as a Closure Device

Abstract

Abstract For all the importance of legislators being willing to forge deep compromises through a process of collective reasoning, there is no doubt but that they will have to resort to voting, at the end of the day, to determine which proposals will have the force of law. Some form of majority rule is the obviously favored candidate for a closure device. Does reliance on majority rule seriously impede, or render impossible, achieving the ideal of a rationalist populism? Is legislative use of majority rule compatible with democracy as democratic autonomy? There are two distinct aspects of this question. First, is legislative use of majority rule compatible with the populist demand for rule by the people? Second, is it compatible with the rationalist demand for truth-oriented democratic deliberation? Majority Rule in Populist Government The question about the compatibility between majority rule and populism might seem a strange one, as many have simply equated populism with unfettered majority rule. My interpretation of populism, however, has been different. Instead, it has demanded that democratic government be such that each individual is treated as a free and equal autonomous participant in a fair process of lawmaking. Together with the rationalist strand, this generates a hope for unanimity or consensus. Hence the question about the compatibility between majority rule and populism is a question about why consensus among the legislators is not what would be required to achieve the ideals of democracy as democratic autonomy. How can majority rule play a role in forging the will of the entire people? At an abstract level, the answer to this question is the same as the answer to the parallel question about representative government: because majority rule is an eminently fair and sensible procedure by which to make collective decisions. I have disavowed any search for an antecedently existent will of