Abstract
Abstract Reference magnetism is an appealing meta-semantic theory for moral realists, since it applies to properties that are metaphysically elite, and the idea that moral properties are among the elite properties is an attractive one for realists. They can also appeal to it to explain both the scope and limits of the stability of moral terms. Moral terms are highly stable, because users of moral language who don’t apply their word ‘right’ to moral rightness will still refer to it, rather than non-elite properties that fit their use better. However, this does not imply that all users of moral language refer to moral rightness. If there are other morally relevant properties besides rightness that are also primitively elite, then it is possible for some users to refer to these. Realists can use reference magnetism to explain why moral terms are highly stable, without committing themselves to the Universal Disagreement thesis. These insights can also be implemented within a contextualist semantics for practical language.
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