Magna Moralia and Nicomachean Ethics

Both undisputably Aristotelian Ethics – the Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics – are set up as a conceptual analysis prompted by the definition of happiness. The definition of happiness is arrived at in the very first thematic section in both Ethics. Happiness is the chief and supreme good the obtainment of which all our actions are subordinated to. The definition of happiness is not only pivotal to moral philosophy as Aristotle conceives of it, but also provides the elements for the subsequent parts of the treatise, as the following sections build on and unfold what is mentioned in or presupposed by it, both treatises being concluded with a discussion about first and second happiness, thus closing the loop in what looks like a ring construction. Both definitions have at their core the notion of moral virtue. In their grand lines, both definitions are pretty similar. However, there are several differences worth stressing when one looks more accurately at the Eudemian and the Nicomachean definitions on moral virtue. The most important one, on which this chapter is focused, concerns the role pleasure and pain play in the Eudemian definition, whereas, in the Nicomachean version, they no longer appear in the definiens, where instead one finds the decisive mention of the practically wise person as he determines, absent from the Eudemian version. These differences have consequences on the way one is supposed to conceive happiness and the moral agent as such.

In several of his writings Hegel suggests an identification of his absolute idea/spirit with Aristotle's God in the Metaphysics. This suggestion is remarkable since it indicates that Hegel regarded his philosophy in line with classical positions in ancient metaphysics. Although there is increasing discussion of the relation between Hegel and Aristotle it is still doubtful what it was that Hegel seemed to find at the highest point of Aristotle's philosophy. To clarify this relation within the realm of first philosophy I will first give a short reconstruction of Aristotle's conception of God in order, second, to confront this conception with the absolute idea/spirit in Hegel. Against Ferrarin, I will not primarily discuss the conception of actuality/activity and infinite subjectivity; rather I will focus on Aristotle's and Hegel's ontological understanding of truth. The new thesis in my paper is that Hegel can relate his theory of the absolute idea/spirit to Aristotle's God on the basis of their shared understanding of truth. This understanding allows both of them to find the highest realization and thus the fulfillment of truth in the self-thinking thinking of God (Aristotle) or the self-thinking thinking of the absolute idea/spirit (Hegel). When Hegel seems to return to Aristotle at the end of his system, this return has its systematic link in the idea of a fulfilled truth which is God or the Absolute in the sense of self-thinking thinking. Although Hegel's return to Aristotle's theology has a certain plausibility, it is also limited by the fact that for Aristotle God's self-thinking thinking is not a process of self-determination, as Hegel finds it to be and which leads him to miss a crucial feature of Aristotle's theology.

The Peripatetic definitions of happiness, which the author wishes to discuss occur in groups in Stobaeus' collection of ethical material. These groups overlap and each is surrounded by other matter, which is relevant to our understanding of them. Many of the definitions come directly from Aristotle, but others differ from him in emphasis and expression, and may be supposed to originate with some of his successors. Further, between the originators of the definitions and the final putting together of the material by Ioannes Stobaeus nearly a millenium later, a number of other writers seem to have played a part and it is not an easy matter to disentangle their contributions. The author suggests that the early Peripatetics produced a number of different definitions of happiness and the telos. These were later formed into collections, and these collections were used by Arius Didymus. To sum up, the definitions in Stobaeus are closely related to Aristotle's esoteric writings and the MM.

Мета статті – перша (оцінна) спроба побудови хронологічної схеми карбування «борисфенів» усіх груп (та подолання альтернативи між двома найбільш поширеними хронологічними схемами П. О. Каришковського та В. О. Анохіна) шляхом виконання просопографічної інтерпретації диферентів. Методика дослідження – типові наукові методи у поєднанні з власними науковими розробленнями автора із синхронізації епонімного каталогу IPE I2 201 (календаря) та просопографії Ольвії. Наукова новизна. У першому наближенні досліджено історичний контекст, який містять диференти на «борисфенах», тобто виконано ототожнення деяких із них з реальними історичними особами. Відповідно, на цій основі побудована орієнтовна хронологічна модель карбування «борисфенів». Висновки. Диференти на «борисфенах» не мають епонімного характеру, однак приблизно 50–60 % із них позначають осіб – монетних магістратів, які згідно з античною традицією в суміжні роки обіймали епонімну посаду (це характерно і для емісій «Деметра-орел, дельфін» 360–330 рр. до н. е. тощо). Диференти (монограми, скорочення), як і імена, підпорядковані стійкій в античному суспільстві традиції родового наслідування. Зазвичай, диференти зазнавали спрощення не тільки упродовж року, але і в разі застосування їх особами з наступних поколінь, пов’язаних родинними узами (наприклад, ΣΩΚΡΣΩΚΣΩ та ΘΕΟΘΕ або ΑΘΗΑΘ, або ΕΥΒΙΟΕΥΒ, або ΒΟΣΠΟΡΙΒΟΣ тощо). Припущення В. О. Анохіна про належність диферентів із різних груп, що повторюються, до однієї особи, яка неодноразово брала участь у карбуванні, та, відповідно, про тривалість випуску «борисфенів» не більше двох-трьох десятиліть, суперечить античній традиції. Початок емісії «борисфенів» – 330 р. до н. е., завершення – орієнтовно 219 р. до н. е. Перша група «борисфенів» датується з 330 до 319 рр. до н. е. включно, друга – з 307 до 301 рр. до н. е. включно; третя – у діапазоні 290 – 271+12 р. до н. е.; четверта–шоста (37 рокових випусків) – орієнтовно з 270+12 до 234+12 рр. до н. е. включно. Також отримані орієнтовні датування сьомої–десятої груп у діапазоні 232+12– 219 рр. до н. е. Патроніми великої групи епонімів 220 – 208 рр. до н. е. корелюють із диферентами «борисфенів» другої половини випусків п’ятої групи, підтверджуючи, згідно з законом генеалогії, їхнє датування в діапазоні 250 – 240 рр. до н. е. За палеографією диферент № 92 не може бути датований раніше останньої третини III ст. до н. е. В. О. Анохін установив масовий характер зв’язку двох і більше диферентів спільними лицьовими штемпелями, на підставі чого головним висновком дослідника стало припущення про існування спеціальних колегій магістратів, які для I–VI групи налічували шість осіб, а для останніх груп – двох осіб, відповідно, тривалість випуску «борисфенів» складала не більше двох-трьох десятиліть. Схема В. О. Анохіна має протиріччя: збільшення об’єму емісії останніх груп майже у шість разів щодо перших супроводжувалося зменшенням кількості магістратів – із шести до двох. Застосування ж спільних штемпелів упродовж кількох років (не більше чотирьох) нами пояснюється не однорічною емісією групи магістратів, а реалізацією відомої в античній монетній справі технології, яка передбачала використання кількох однотипних лицьових штемпелів, розташованих поряд на ковадлі. Поява такої технології цілком зрозуміла з огляду на тривалість та інтенсивність випуску. Нам невідомі принципи, якими керувалися монетарії у разі використання того чи іншого лицьового штемпеля, але, ймовірно, така технологія забезпечувала умовно рівномірне їх зношування; своїм наслідком вона мала появу монет із різними комбінаціями диферентів, пов’язаними спільними лицьовими штемпелями, упродовж кількох років. Отже, із двох найбільш відомих хронологічних схем карбування «борисфенів» (П. О. Каришковського та В. О. Анохіна) ми однозначно віддаємо перевагу схемі П. О. Каришковського (з деякими уточненнями хронології останніх груп).Просопографічне дослідження диферентів на «борисфенах» усіх груп виконано вперше, тому його треба сприймати як оцінне та наближене. Цілком очевидна необхідність подальших досліджень з метою подолання альтернативних варіантів інтерпретації, уточнення та вдосконалення моделі у хронологічній лакуні епонімного каталогу. Також необхідна ревізія інтерпретації скарбів, вивчення нових варіантів диферентів, співвідношення «борисфенів» з іншими монетами, подальше дослідження особливостей родового наслідування монограм та співставлення результатів нумізматичних досліджень із просопографічними.

Reviewed by: Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics ed. by Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams Anthony Celano Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams, editors. Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. x + 275. Cloth, $95.00. The main question addressed in this volume is to what extent did Thomas Aquinas “deal with and depend on Aristotle’s Ethics” (1). The editors and contributors discuss the setting and intent of Thomas’s commentary (Sententiae supra libros Ethicorum) on the text of Aristotle, which was likely completed during his magisterial activity at Paris in 1271–72. They consider various scholarly opinions on the commentary, including those concerning its date of composition and whether Thomas expresses his own views, or merely provides a careful exposition of Aristotle’s text. An important topic for all contributors is the consideration of the commentary in light of Thomas’s theological treatises, especially the Summa theologiae, in order to understand how Thomas’s reading of Aristotle’s moral philosophy contributes to his own understanding of important issues in ethics. The first two articles by Terrence Irwin and Michael Pakaluk discuss the accuracy and general approach of Thomas toward Aristotle. Both rightly indicate that Thomas does not approach Aristotle in the manner of a modern scholar who seeks faithfully to explain the text, but rather as a way to discover truth. Although Thomas always attempts to comprehend Aristotle’s thought thoroughly, he does not hesitate to indicate its limits when compared to religious belief. Thomas is generally reluctant to criticize Aristotle directly and often provides a charitable reading for controversial ideas. When discussing the question of the possibility of perfect beatitude, Thomas claims that Aristotle refrained from such a discussion in Ethics, because the fate of the separate soul belongs to a different science. Irwin concludes that we ought to take Thomas seriously as a historically accurate interpreter of Aristotle, even if he does introduce un-Aristotelian topics, such as the will, into his understanding of Aristotle (30). Jörn Müller’s article builds upon his earlier work on Albert the Great on the relation between happiness and beatitude. Müller claims that Aristotle offers “not one unified account of happiness, but rather a ‘two-fold happiness’” (55). Albert did indeed accept the notion of two distinct types of happiness (duefelicitates), but Thomas rejects this interpretation in favor of one that views Aristotelian eudaimonia as the single perfection of human beings within a lifetime. Müller indicates the importance of the qualification by Aristotle that human beings can only be beati ut homines for Thomas’s view that perfect beatitude may be attained in the afterlife (62). Here Müller believes that Thomas seems brazenly to ignore Aristotle’s designation of the contemplative life as perfect happiness. Thomas, however, did not have so much difficulty in showing that the philosophical life does not meet the criterion for ultimate finality and self-sufficiency, since he finds support in Aristotle’s own [End Page 376] text. In book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does indeed find human contemplation lacking in comparison to the perfect continuous activity of divine beings. Human beings cannot engage in perfect activity since they always must tend to biological and social needs. Contemplation is perfect in that it actualizes the supreme potential within the human soul (nous), but it is not perfect without qualification. Eight of the remaining nine articles consider individual virtues and their treatment in Thomas’s commentary and in his more systematic theological works. The contributors agree that Thomas’s astute interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy does not unduly limit his ability to draw upon various sources to arrive at his own conclusions. A particularly important essay concerns the virtue of prudence (phronesis), which Tobias Hoffmann discusses clearly and accurately. Hoffmann correctly identifies synderesis, the innate habit of recognizing universal moral principles, as an important element in Thomas’s own thought. Through synderesis, Thomas anchors prudence in natural reason, rather than in the moral virtues themselves, and thereby avoids a circular causal relationship between desire and reason (174). Hoffmann emphasizes the importance of particular judgments, or the minor premises, in the...

Aristotelian Necessities

In Aristotle the universal is the object of art, philosophy and science. Some famous passages in his works say it very clearly. In the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) as well, when speaking about episteme , Aristotle says what is typical of episteme is to have an account of the universal and the necessary. The definition of happiness is the central point of the NE , on which all the pragmateia depends. In NE chapter I Aristotle repeats this definition, and begins a very wide section of the work, starting from here and going to the end of NE IV, dedicated to the notion of arete . The discussion in NE II starts with an explicit reference to the conclusion of book I. Aristotle calls the particular virtues kath' hekasta . This chapter discusses the origin of Aristotle's list of moral virtues; some have remarked that Aristotle does not follow Plato's list of four main virtues. Keywords: Aristotle's list ofmoral virtues; definition of happiness; Nicomachean Ethics (NE)

This article reexamines the text and interpretation of three crucial passages in Avitus of Vienne’s Ep. 46, the only contemporary document attesting the baptism of Clovis, and one passage in Gregory of Tours’Decem Libri Historiarum. The following conclusions relative to the date and circumstances of the baptism can be drawn. A. Avitus addresses Clovis not as if he was a pagan convert, but as if he was a recent Arian sympathiser, possibly even a catechumen. 2. There is no allusion to Clovis's honorary consulship in Ep. 46, hence no terminus post quem of 508. 3. The populus adhue nuper captivus cannot be the Alamans or the newly‐converted Franks. Clovis's letter to the Bishops of Aquitaine and Avitus's known involvement in the ransoming of prisoners‐of‐war are adduced to suggest that the populus may most plausibly be identified with Catholic Gallo‐Roman captives taken in the Franco‐Visigothic war of 507. If this is right, it provides a terminus post quem, of 507 and suggests a baptism in Christmas 508. 4. Gregory of Tours’ account of the Alamannic war is reexamined, and the following conclusions reached: the account fuses a “Clotilde‐spool” and a “Constantinian‐spool;” the battle against the Alamanni must date to late 506 (evidence from Cassiodorus and Ennodius); but Gregory himself did not know when it took place in absolute terms, and his relative chronology may well be unreliable. Thus the date of the battle and the date of conversion can be uncoupled. The most probable terminus post quem remains the freeing of the populus captivus, probably after the war of 507. The article ends by reexamining the implications of Clovis's and Avitus's relationship and correspondence.

This paper presents a formal framework for synchronizing strata and datable artefacts in multi-layered sites. We first present a simple set of rules regarding the definition of safe termini post quem, taking into account cases of uncertain dating and/or uncertain stratigraphic attribution of the artifacts. We then propose a definition of chronologically optimal termini post quem, and a procedure to represent these optimal termini graphically by a step function in a two-dimensional graph. We also propose a definition of chronologically critical artifacts, as a minimal set of artifacts that determine all the optimal termini post quem of a stratigraphic sequence. Finally, we define a measure of the robustness of a terminus post quem, expressed in terms of the number of different artifacts supporting this terminus. We illustrate our approach through the case study of Egyptian scarabs from the site of Beth Shean (northern Israel), a well-known Bronze and Iron Age site that hosted an Egyptian garrison during the New Kingdom (ca. 1540–1070 B.C.E.). We also provide a software utility which assists users in applying our methodology.

European metal artifacts in assemblages from sites predating the physical presence of Europeans in Northern Iroquoia in present-day New York, USA and southern Ontario, Canada have been used as chronological markers for the mid-sixteenth century AD. In the Mohawk River Valley of New York, European metal artifacts at sites pre-dating the physical presence of Europeans have been used by archaeologists as a terminus post quem (TPQ) of 1525 to 1550 in regional chronologies. This has been done under the assumption that these metals did not begin to circulate until after sustained European presence on the northern Atlantic coast beginning in 1517. Here we use Bayesian chronological modeling of a large set of radiocarbon dates to refine our understanding of early European metal circulation in the Mohawk River Valley. Our results indicate that European iron and cuprous metals arrived earlier than previously thought, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, and cannot be used as TPQs. Together with recent Bayesian chronological analyses of radiocarbon dates from several sites in southern Ontario, these results add to our evolving understanding of intra-regional variation in Northern Iroquoia of sixteenth-century AD circulation and adoption of European goods.

In different excavations in Ramla, fragmented Muslim tombstones were uncovered in secondary use, providing a terminus post quem in the mid or late 10th-century AD for their reuse. As showed by the ceramic evidence, the time elapsed between the last interments and the reusing of the tombstones stones as building material was at the most 70 years. Reusing of tombstones is a common archeological occurrence. In most cases, the reutilizing is carried out after a time enough to cut the emotional link between the burial and the builders, or when an ethnical replacement occurred, and new dwellers had no emotional relationship with the previous ones. The phenomenon in Ramla is then an exception. What were the circumstances that led to such an unusual comportment? One possible explanation is the occurrence of a traumatic event, such an earthquake. Following the dates on the stones, it is evident that the event could have occurred only after 961 AD. This could fit the tremor in 1033 AD, two generations after the erection of the tombstones. As for the lifespan of the reconstruction layers, the pottery assemblages related to them, show ceramic types diagnostic to the Fatimid period, not in use in the Crusader period. This, together with the simultaneous abandonment of sites in the city, suggest that the destruction of the reconstruction strata was caused by another catastrophic event, perhaps the 1068 AD tremor. If so, we have a hatch to a well-defined period, limited by two powerful natural catastrophes, that provide termini ante and post quem for the ephemeral reconstruction of the city.

Providing the only full-length study of the compendium of Greek philosophy attributed to Didymus, court philosopher to the Roman emperor Caesar Augustus, this volume elucidates Stoic and ethics for classicists and philosophers. authors provide careful textual analysis of important passages by this synthesizer of the major schools of Greek thought. Essays include translations of major passages. Contents and Contributors: Charles H. Kahn, Arius as a Doxographer; David E. Hahm, The Diaeretic Method and the Purpose of Arius' Doxography; Anthony A. Long, Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics; Margaret E. Reesor, On the Stoic Goods in Stobaeus, Eclogue 2; George B. Kerferd, Two Problems Concerning Impulses; Ian G. Kidd, Euemptosia-Proneness to Disease; Pamela M. Huby, Peripatetic Definitions of Happiness; Robert W. Sharpies, The Classification of Goods; Herwig Goregemanns, Oikiosis in Didymus; William W. Fortenbaugh, Arius, Theophrastus, and the Eudemian Ethics.

In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives us two definitions of happiness (eudaimonia): In book I he defines eudaimonia as activity in accordance with the best and most perfect virtue, and very much later in the treatise, in book X, he states that the contemplative life of the philosopher is the most blessed life, and the life of the politician only second in rank. This paper argues that most interpreters have misunderstood the first definition (i.e. they have not correctly identified the best and most perfect virtue) due to the temptation to read the first book with the tenth in mind. A new interpretation of the first definition is corroborated and linked with Aristotle’s statements in book X, so that the entire work seems to be more consistent. Furthermore, a solution to the vexed problem whether moral virtues play a role in the contemplative life is suggested.

In his Book of the Bee, the 13th century historian and Syriac bishop Solomon of Baṣra has kept an apocryphal text, here translated and analyzed, concerning the thirty pieces of silver Judas received for his betrayal of Christ, after a long chain of transmission. Godfrey of Viterbo had related this legend before, referring to an Armenian source. Considering later Armenian versions, one may suggest that Armenian played an important role in the diffusion of narrative elements of this text drawn on a Syriac original prior to the 12th century and reworked. Some details could indicate the 6th century as a terminus post quem, and correlations established with Edessa as a production from the Edessean milieu.

This article discusses a special type of narrative: encounters with named individuals in hell. The catchment is broad (Homer to Dante) but the focus is on the early Middle Ages. Philological and literary techniques elucidate and reinterpret a number of important visionary texts, Anglo‐Saxon, Merovingian, and Carolingian. Boniface, Ep. 115 re‐emerges as a woman’s vision. Gregory of Tours, DLH 8.5 (Guntram’s banquet of 585), where Chilperic is sighted, finds a place within the Roman tradition of the dark or terrifying banquet and the dangerous telling of dreams. In the Visio Pauperculae (terminus post quem = 3 October 818), Queen Irmengard’s torture is reinterpreted by reference to the NT and to contemporary legal realia. An argument is made for an old emendation that required a romantic and courtly reading, including a fuzzy connection to Dante’s Inferno 5.