Madhyamaka

Abstract

The Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school, along with the Yogācāra, is one of the two major schools of Indian Mahayana Buddhist thought, which flourished there from the 3rd century ce to the final destruction of Buddhism in India in about the 12th century. It was carried to East Asia and Tibet prior to this time and continues there to this day, surviving in scholastic Tibetan Buddhism, Zen, and even Pure Land, frequently regarded as the cornerstone of Mahayana thought. The name “middle way” refers to a fundamental claim in Buddhism that the teachings of the Buddha constitute a middle way between eternalism and annihilationism; that is, between the doctrine that things have a stable and eternal essence, and the doctrine that things pass utterly out of existence when they cease. “Mādhyamika” is the adjectival form that refers to adherents of the Madhyamaka school. Though central Madhyamaka ideas such as the Two Truths and Emptiness can be found in Nikaya Buddhism and in Mahayana sutras, it is with the treatises of Nāgārjuna (2nd–3rd centuries ce) that we have a fully formed and distinct system of thought that we can call Madhyamaka. In Nāgārjuna’s texts, he subjects all phenomena, including the Abhidharma categories of dharmas and the structure of the Two Truths, to radical analysis, declaring all things, including the Four Noble Truths and the Buddha himself, to be empty of inherent nature. For the Abhidharmikas, dharmas possess their characteristics intrinsically, which make them uniquely what they are, despite accepting the paradigmatic Buddhist position that all things exist dependently. Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamikas assert that dharmas cannot possess their own nature precisely because they exist dependently. In place of inherent nature, Nāgārjuna asserts that things exist only dependently, at least in conventional terms, and that ultimately, emptiness of inherent nature is the truth and reality of all things. Not surprisingly, numerous interpreters arose to elucidate this difficult philosophy. The question of which commentator is definitive has occupied many generations of Indian, East Asian, and Tibetan Buddhists, and the issue remains very much alive in modern scholarship. Much of the interest in Western scholarship has come, unsurprisingly, from philosophy, but it warrants noting that the intent of Madhyamaka, like all Buddhist thought, is primarily soteriological in nature.