Macroeconomic Policy, Strategic Leadership, and Voter Behaviour: The Disparate Tales of Socialist Reformism in Greece and Spain during the 1980s

Abstract

This article is a comparative study of the socialist governments in Greece and Spain during the 1980s and is motivated by two interrelated puzzles: first, the sharp policy divergence in these countries despite their previously common political trajectories, comparable socioeconomic conditions, and the similar ideological profiles of their respective parties in office; and, second, the fact that both governments won re-election in the mid-1980s although only the Spanish, but not the Greek socialists, had applied a successful reformist agenda. Using a methodology based on the strategic role of political leaderships, this article challenges the general validity of both the partisan theory of macroeconomic policy and the theory of economic voting (the VP function). Instead, it is shown that strong and undisputed leaders may choose to promote political polarisation and social mobilisation thus creating the conditions for ideological, rather than economic, voting. Each strategy is expected to produce different long-term outcomes for both the governments and the countries involved.