Machtindex und Drittelmitbestimmung. Differenzierter Arbeitnehmereinfluss und dessen Konsequenzen

Abstract

Abstract We are using a panel data set of companies listed in one of the three largest German stock indices between 1998 and 2007 with a third of the directors on the supervisory board representing employees. We measure the influence of these employee representatives by established power indices. Although all analysed companies fulfil the co-determination law and give a third of the directorships to employee representatives, in only about a third of these companies the employees have a corresponding power. In nearly half of the analysed companies the employees merely have information rights. Regression analyses indicate an inversely U-shaped relationship between employee power in the supervisory board and company performance. Zusammenfassung Anhand eines Paneldatensatzes der drittelmitbestimmten Unternehmen im DAX, MDAX und SDAX zwischen 1998 und 2007 wird der tatsachliche Einfluss der Arbeitnehmervertreter im Aufsichtsrat uber in der Spieltheorie etablierte Machtindizes gemessen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass f...