Machiavellism: A Philosophical Defense

Abstract

It might appear curious that, although Machiavelli is the one and only thinker in our entire history whose name has become a popular and indelible symbol for a certain view of morality and a certain manner of performing actions, his thought is almost totally absent from the mainstream of contemporary discussions of morality. On the surface this may to some extent be justified: Machiavelli was certainly not a moral philosopher in the sense of an Aristotle or a Kant, and his writings do not add up to anything like a comprehensive explanation even of practical morality, let alone an account of the meaning of moral judgments. Yet it cannot be without some significance that we recognize in the world, in a sense in which no Aristotelianism or Kantianism can be said to exist, and it is at least an open question whether its explanatory and advisory value is confined exclusively to political and international morality. My purpose in this article is to suggest some ways in which the importance of Machiavellism can be better appreciated and in an extended, generalized sense: as a view of morality that applies not only to actions in political or international life, but to practical moral action as such. I shall concern myself mainly with laying bare the assumptions about the nature of human actions and moral principles on the basis of which Machiavellism could be seen to make some sense. My method, having at first summarily stated what I take to be the most plausible interpretations of Machiavelli's own teaching of morality, involves the roundabout way of proceeding from a consideration of certain basic conditions of moral life in general, giving prominence, whenever appropriate, to principles that seemingly contradict Machiavellism.