Abstract
In this paper I'd like to clarify how ‘value-interest’ and ‘the category of objective possibility’ play the role in Max Weber's ‘ideal type’. A. Schelting and T. Parsons criticized the duality of ideal type that implicated ‘historical individual’ and ‘general concept’. In addition to this critisism Parsons insisted that in contradiction to Weber's view the distinction between ‘natural science’ and ‘social science’ was not based on logical aspect but on real one. For him both sciences needed ‘value interest’ and every concept expresses part of reality. Therefore he proposed another distinction of sciences. Thus he contrasted historical sciences with analytic ones. But I think these criticisms are based on insufficient understanding of Weber's methodology.
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