Abstract
On a sample of 1098 US publicly listed target firms, we show that target initiated deals face potential financial distress and have higher CEO ownership. We further show that CEOs are motivated to offer their firm for sale due to their higher ownership, golden parachutes and stock and stock option grants before the takeover. Moreover, motivated CEOs seem to actively participate in deal negotiations rather than be just bribed not to resit the deal and their ownership and equity grants are positively correlated with premium. This suggests a positive role for deal initiation for target shareholders.
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