Lévy-Bruhl and Modes of Thought: A Re-Appraisal

Abstract

In this paper I examine the relevance of Lévy Bruhl's work for contemporary anthropological theory. Starting with a brief summary of his writings, I go on to explore his concept of primitive thought, showing how his ideas were influenced by Durkheim and depended mainly on the notion of collective representations. However, Lévy-Bruhl's use of this concept, while Durkheimian in its sources, differed from Durkheim's original usage. It is this difference which I explore following suggestions by Waismann and other logicians interested in non-standard logics. I assess the response to Lévy-Bruhl's ideas both by his contemporaries and by more recent anthropologists, pointing out that much of their criticism is based on a misunderstanding of his position, combined with a lack of awareness on the part of most anthropologists of non-standard, alternative logics. Finally I argue the importance of Lévy-Bruhl's questions (but not his answers) for anthropologists interested in exploring modes of thought found in social structures which legitimate marked ambiguities in discourse and practice, and whose formal logical models do not conform to the aristotelian naradigm.