Luck EgalitarianismEquality, Responsibility, and Justice

Abstract

How far does our responsibility for one another's well-being extend? At what point, if ever, is each person be responsible for success or failure in running their own life? How should we decide which inequalities between people are justified, and which are unjustified? One answer is that such inequalities are only justified where there is a corresponding variation in responsible action or choice on the part of the persons concerned. This view, which has become known as ‘luck egalitarianism’, has come to occupy a central place in recent debates about distributive justice. This book is a full-length treatment of this development in contemporary political philosophy, providing a critical survey of debates about responsibility, equality and justice. Each of its three parts addresses a key question concerning the theory. Which version of luck egalitarian comes closest to realizing luck egalitarian objectives? Does luck egalitarianism succeed as a view of egalitarian justice? Is it sound as an account of distributive justice in general? The book provides a distinctive answer to each of these questions, engaging along the way with the leading theorists identified in the literature as luck egalitarians, such as Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin, as well as the most influential critics, including Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, Samuel Scheffler and Jonathan Wolff.